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Why Politicians Like Electoral Institutions: 
Self-Interest, Values, or Ideology? 
Shaun Bowler University of California, Riverside 
Todd Donovan Western Washington University 
Jeffrey A. Karp Texas Tech University and University of Twente, the Netherlands 
We examine whether MPs and candidates for parliament are motivated by electoral self-interest, values, ideology, 
or all of these when evaluating proposals for changing electoral institutions. Using survey data from four countries 
(Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand), we find that candidates who won election are less sup- 
portive ofproposals to change institutions, while those who lost elections are more supportive of institutional changes. 
Winning candidates hare preferences for institutions that are independent of whether they are affiliated with a gov- 
erning or opposition party. This self-interest effect is attenuated by ideology and attitudes about democracy. Pure 
self-interest, then, is an incomplete explanation for politicians' attitudes towards electoral institutions. We discuss 
how these findings are related to the static nature of political institutions. 
hange in election rules is a relatively rare event 
in established democracies (Dunleavy and 
Margetts 1995; Lijphart 1992). One central 
assumption of theories of electoral system change is 
that those in power only change rules strategically, in 
order to protect their self-interest (Benoit 2004; Boix 
1999; Grofman 1990; Rokkan 1970; in contrast see 
Andrews and Jackman 2005; Blais and Massicotte 
1997). Change in electoral institutions is relatively rare 
because it is the winners under status quo rules, as Cox 
notes (1997, 18), who must find it in their interest to 
alter the rules they were elected under. Institutions are 
"sticky" because politicians are assumed to want 
durable rules that allow them to maintain control over 
their fate (Przeworski 1991; Shepsle 2001, 321). 
This key assumption about self-interest structur- 
ing politicians' preferences for institutions, however, 
has not been tested with direct evidence from politi- 
cians themselves. In this paper we examine politicians' 
attitudes about changing electoral institutions in four 
established democracies. We demonstrate that 
rational self-interest is a major feature of elite attitudes 
about electoral institutions, but we also establish that 
attitudes about democracy and political ideology also 
have a role to play. We conclude that once in power, 
politicians may develop a great deal of positive affect 
for current institutions and a resistance to change; 
regardless of whether or not their party is part of gov- 
ernment or opposition. These findings shed some 
light on why electoral institutions are typically so 
resilient. 
Politicians' Evaluations of Electoral 
Institutions 
We can understand politicians' attitudes and opinions 
towards electoral institutions in terms of two broad 
theoretical frameworks. Although these frameworks 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they offer rival 
explanations and imply different understandings of 
the relationship between politicians and the institu- 
tions under which they work. 
Winning, Losing, and Self-Interested Views 
of Institutions 
Electoral systems often have clear-cut effects in deter- 
mining who is elected and who has influence over the 
political agenda. Put differently, electoral rules deter- 
mine who winners and losers are-as such alterations 
in these rules have effects that politicians are keen to 
understand (Tsebelis 1990, 104). After a system has 
been in use for some time, it is generally apparent to 
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those playing the electoral game how the rules define 
who the winners and losers may be. One of the major 
concerns facing politicians, then, will be concerns 
for winning and, in particular, losing (Anderson and 
Guillory 1997). Losers, wanting to become winners, 
may support rule changes that they anticipate may 
make them winners in the electoral arena,' or give 
them more influence over policymaking (Miller 1983; 
Riker 1980, 445). Meanwhile incumbents may resist 
changing rules given that they are familiar with the 
rules that placed them in office and given risk aversion 
associated with the uncertainty inherent in new elec- 
toral institutions (Andrews and Jackman 2005; 
Shvetsova 2003). If incumbent (winners') self-interest 
structures preferences for electoral institutions, 
change is likely only when a sufficient number of 
incumbents expect to gain more influence under new 
rules (Benoit 2004) or when opposition forces reach 
sufficient density to force change upon incumbents 
(Norris 1995). 
The argument that politicians' views of electoral 
institutions will be strongly colored by self-interest is 
hardly a surprising one. It is, for example, consistent 
with several previous case studies of politicians in a 
wide variety of settings and time periods (e.g., Angus 
1952; Bawn 1993; Boix 1999; Bowler, Donovan, and 
Karp 2002; Geddes 1996; Gunther 1989; Rokkan 
1970). We suggest that there are two ways in which 
self-interested politicians may perceive winning and 
losing: their own personal win or loss and that of their 
party. In general we expect that the sense of personal 
loss will be most keenly felt by politicians and that 
they will be most responsive to that loss. Therefore, we 
expect that losing candidates will be most supportive 
of change, all other things being equal. 
It is also possible that there is a "party" interest 
that is distinct from a candidate's personal interest. 
For example, winners in opposition parties may gen- 
erally be supportive of changes that give the opposi- 
tion greater influence. Small parties are favored by 
proportional rules, so we might expect winners from 
smaller parties to favor changes that might make their 
election system more proportional. Katz and Mair 
(1995) propose another version of party interest: 
incumbents in and out of government may have 
shared interests and may form cartels to limit electoral 
competition. 
To claim that politicians view institutions in self- 
interested terms may seem so straightforward that 
some might find it a bit of a "straw-man." It is impor- 
tant to note that our stress on winning and losing puts 
limitations on what we mean by self-interest. The 
version of self-interest we advance here emphasizes 
incumbents' concerns for avoiding loss rather than 
making gains, and, second, it assumes politicians- 
particularly losers seeking to be winners-may not 
understand the long term consequences of changes 
they consider. 
There is a different model of how self-interest 
drives politician's views of electoral change that 
assumes politicians may work to maximize future 
gains via rules changes (e.g., Angus 1952; Benoit 
2004). This model may fit cases where electoral 
reforms can be designed to benefit incumbents over 
the long term (i.e., restrictive ballot access rules; dis- 
tricting procedures that create safer seats). However 
we are interested in how politicians reason about elec- 
toral reforms that might alter incumbent power (i.e., 
term limits and initiative use) or create uncertainty 
about election outcomes (i.e., compulsory voting). 
Electoral reforms, furthermore, are not as common as 
one might expect given a model that assumes gain- 
maximizing, forward-looking incumbent behavior 
as the definition of self-interest. As Benoit notes, 
electoral change is not costless. Such models of self- 
interest may overstate how much is known about elec- 
toral laws and their effects: reforms bring risks of 
unintended consequences. 
Despite all their incentives to understand electoral 
systems, then, politicians may have an imperfect 
understanding of them, possibly dampening the effect 
of prospective self-interest on preferences for institu- 
tions. Uncertainty and risk aversion are therefore 
likely to be major factors that may make it difficult for 
politicians to rely upon self-interest to evaluate pro- 
posals for changing electoral institutions. Of particu- 
lar importance is uncertainty (Andrews and Jackman 
2005; Shvetsova 2003). Even if politicians do become 
aware of the consequences of, say, term limits or a shift 
away from proportionality, it may take them a while 
to understand the consequences of how the change 
affects a party's prospects for winning or losing. As 
Birch et al. note in their discussion of changes in 
Eastern Europe, "actors had some understanding of 
the general consequences of electoral systems vis-a-vis 
party development. Yet they were often mistaken when 
it came to the specifics.., and this hampered their 
ability to craft electoral institutions to suit their 
immediate political ends" (2003, 170; emphasis in 
original). 
'There are many examples among mass publics and politicians, 
including debate over proportional representation (PR) in the 
United Kingdom, support for PR in New Zealand, electoral system 
reform in Japan and Italy and mass support for term limits in the 
United States. 
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Although there are different ways of defining and 
modeling self-interest, the version we have advanced 
here-that winners seek to protect the status quo-is 
consistent with these limitations of information and 
costliness. Politicians may well have concerns for gain 
maximization over some discounted time horizon but 
these concerns will--by hypothesis-only come after 
the concerns about shorter-term losses are addressed. 
Values, Ideology, and Attitudes about 
Democracy 
There are several plausible reasons for expecting that 
explanations of politicians' views of institutions are 
not wholly grounded in self-interest: even a version of 
self-interest that takes account of uncertainty and risk 
aversion. An alternative theoretical framework chal- 
lenges the primacy of self-interest as an explanation 
of politicians' preferences for electoral institutions. 
Politicians' views about democratic processes may also 
mute the potential effect of electoral self-interest. 
Opinions of politicians across a range of issues, 
including institutional issues, are likely to be shaped 
by values. A study of election rules in 166 nations con- 
cluded that selection of an electoral system is not 
merely the product of partisan interest, "but is also 
strongly influenced by ideas about what is good or 
just" (Blais and Massicotte 1997, 107; see also Rahat 
2004; Sakamoto 1999). Concerns about democratic 
process inform views of political institutions, even at 
a mass level (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Tyler 
1990). We know, furthermore, that elites have views 
that are strongly constrained or shaped by ideology 
(e.g., Converse 1964; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985). 
Politicians may thus have commitments to values that 
shape their views of how the electoral process should 
be structured; these values may well constrain self- 
interested concerns about whether they win or lose 
under different electoral arrangements. 
A narrow self-interest model of how politicians 
reason about electoral arrangements would suggest a 
concern for outcomes over process: here we suggest 
that ideas about democracy may make process con- 
cerns more relevant.2 Attitudes about the proper role 
of mass participatory democracy, for example, may 
well produce a commitment to, or at least positive 
affect for, specific types of electoral arrangements 
that do not necessarily advance a politicians' own 
electoral prospects or ability to control policy out- 
comes. Process-oriented concerns may thus figure at 
least as prominently as self-interest. Consider the case 
of major campaign finance reform in the United 
States. Despite the fact that some observers predicted 
that the McCain-Feingold legislation would place 
Democrats at a disadvantage relative to Republicans 
in their efforts to finance future elections, party affil- 
iation was an imperfect predictor of floor votes on the 
legislation.3 Numerous Democrats supported the pro- 
posal in the name of improving public perceptions of 
the political process, while prominent Republicans 
opposed it on the grounds that the regulations inhib- 
ited free speech. 
As another example that democratic values may 
shape politicians' preferences for electoral institutions, 
consider Britain's Liberal Democrats' justification of 
their support for proportional representation: 
Governments likely to result from the introduction of 
proportional representation would be more reliant on 
persuasion and debate, rather than sheer weight of 
numbers, to guide through legislation. (Liberal Democ- 
rats 2000, 16) 
That is, normative democratic virtues of deliber- 
ative democracy and participation may be promoted 
through electoral reform. Of course politicians rou- 
tinely clothe naked self-interest in a fig-leaf of noble 
words. In the case of the Liberal Democrats, electoral 
reform not only helps realize their stated democratic 
virtues, but we should remember that it would also 
likely give them many more seats. However, rather 
than dismiss such comments as a rhetorical device dis- 
guising self-interested intentions we could, equally, see 
them as a sincere statement of principle. A commit- 
ment to the principle of inclusion in the political 
process could lead a politician from a "big" party to 
have a commitment to proportional representation, 
even though she (or her party) may otherwise benefit 
from majoritarianism. The example from the Liberal 
Democrats may illustrate that politicians might couch 
talk about institutions in noble terms, rather than 
advocate that a new electoral rule might make them a 
winner. Yet it may well be that such comments are true 
indications of the way politicians really think about 
institutions. Similarly, politicians who are generally 
dissatisfied with how democracy is working in 
2We should stress that this is a different kind of concern for non- 
self-interested explanations than that seen in the discussion in the 
coalition literature of policy-seeking versus office-seeking motiva- 
tions of politicians (Muller and Strom 1999). The kinds of atti- 
tudes we are discussing are those which shape attitudes towards 
the political process more than specific policy outcomes. 
3McCain-Feingold, or the Bi-Partisan Campaign Finance Reform 
Act (BCRA) limited "soft money" contributions to the parties. 
Under President Clinton, Democrats kept pace with Republican 
advantages in "hard" contributions by raising soft money. BCRA 
may shift fundraising efforts to "hard" contributions. 
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their country may be more likely to support a 
wide range of rule changes that might offer them 
perception of an improvement over status quo 
arrangements. 
Hypotheses 
Before testing specific hypotheses about the relation- 
ship between attitudes about democracy, self-interest, 
and politicians' preferences for institutions, we must 
address some matters of definition. Specifically, what 
do we mean by a politician's electoral self-interest, and 
how is it associated with winning and losing? At the 
mass level, definitions have focused on whether voters 
identify with the party that wins or loses control of 
government (e.g., Anderson and Guillory 1997). As for 
elites, there may be more than one way of defining a 
win or a loss. As noted above, a politician's own party 
may win or lose governing power while, independent 
of this, politicians themselves may win or lose their 
own election. A candidate's perspective as a winner or 
loser is defined here by these two variables and can be 
thought of in terms of a simple 2 x 2 classification; 
pairing a candidate's personal success or failure with 
her party's success or failure. That is, there are candi- 
dates who win a seat and their party ends up in gov- 
ernment; those who win a seat but their party is in 
opposition; those who lose but their party is in gov- 
ernment; and those who lose while their party is in 
opposition. 
Self-interest provides expectations about the pref- 
erences of winners who are members of the govern- 
ment. We expect them to be most supportive of 
current electoral arrangements and most resistant to 
institutional change. Conversely, those who personally 
lose an election and whose party is out of power are 
expected to be least sympathetic to the status quo and 
most supportive of institutional changes. Politicians 
who make it to the legislature but remain in the oppo- 
sition as well as those who lose their own election but 
whose party wins office should fall somewhere 
between the two extremes. The degree of affect 
towards or attachment to current electoral institutions 
(e.g., evaluations of how well elections work to make 
MPs reflect voters, and satisfaction with how democ- 
racy works in their nation) is likely to be cooler among 
candidates in this middle group than among those in 
the personal win + party win category, but warmer 
than among those in the personal loss + party loss 
category. 
Self-interest also leads us to expect an additional 
effect, independent of the politician's status as a 
winner or loser. Candidates of smaller parties are 
unlikely to control government-even under propor- 
tional representation (PR) their best hope is to serve 
as the junior member of a coalition. Small-party can- 
didates may thus be more likely to embrace reforms 
that alter the influence of incumbent legislators (term 
limits) and rules that give outsiders more influence 
over the public agenda (direct democracy). 
Alternatives to the self-interest explanation lead 
us to expect that attitudes and values about proper 
democratic arrangements may define politicians' pref- 
erences for institutions. In particular, their attitudes 
about the desirability of democratic participation, or 
their position on the left-right dimension, may affect 
attitudes towards current electoral institutions and 
support for changing electoral arrangements. Demo- 
cratic values, particularly those associated with the 
materialist/post-materialist dimension (Dalton 2002, 
83; Inglehart 1977), are expected to correspond with 
preferences for new electoral rules that provide for 
greater, direct citizen influence over government. 
Post-materialists politicians who value political 
expression and value giving people more say in 
government decisions may be more supportive of 
reforms, even if these reforms weaken their own 
control of the political agenda. Preferences for various 
democratic institutions may also be affected by atti- 
tudes associated with political ideology. Members of 
right-of-center parties, for example, may subscribe 
to classic, small "c" conservatism and be reluctant to 
support changes of any kind and, thus, express more 
affect for the current institutional arrangements. 
Finally, attitudes about specific institutional elements 
of election systems may not be independent of general 
sentiments about the nation's political system, such as 
satisfaction with how democracy is currently working. 
Data, Models and Results 
Data employed to test these hypotheses come from 
surveys of national level politicians in Australia, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, con- 
ducted between 1999 and 2002. These surveys of 
candidates and MPs were conducted at the time of 
general elections in each country. The response rates 
for these surveys range from 51% to 58%. An online 
appendix with details on samples, question wording, 
response rates, and alternative models specifications 
may be found at http://www.journalofpolitics.org. 
Each of these nations are established democracies, 
with basic election rules in Australia, Germany, and 
the Netherlands largely stable for several decades. 
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Nonetheless, electoral reform issues are recurring 
topics of debate in each nation. Expanded use of direct 
democracy has received substantial discussion in 
each nation in the past decade (Dalton, Burklin, and 
Drummond 2001; Karp and Aimer 2002; Williams 
and Chin 2000), as has, to a lesser extent, compulsory 
voting (Mackerras and McAllister 1999), which is used 
in Australia and was used in the Netherlands until 
1970. New Zealand, furthermore, underwent a change 
from winner-take-all to a mixed-member propor- 
tional system in 1996. The Dutch have also been 
debating changing from PR to a mixed system. 
There are two main methodological virtues to this 
cross-national approach. First, data from multiple 
nations allow us to assess the effects of incumbent self- 
interest across different parties and different electoral 
contexts. Second, the multiple country approach helps 
to untangle the effects of values and ideology from 
self-interest. With elite opinion data from just one 
nation it would be difficult to say that opinion of 
members of the government reflected the fact that 
they were in government, or that government 
included right-of-center parties, or a post-materialist 
party. Our four cases, however, give us variation in the 
ideological composition of government with two 
right-of-center governments (Netherlands and 
Australia) and two left-of-center ones (Germany and 
New Zealand). This allows us to distinguish the effects 
of whether a candidate won or lost an election from 
the effects of values and ideology. 
We should address whether politicians may have 
incentives to offer publicly acceptable survey 
responses designed to mask their self-interested views 
of electoral reform. First, it is important to note that 
the surveys were voluntary, conducted through well- 
regarded academic institutions in each nation, and 
that respondents were assured confidentiality. Second, 
respondents were offered the "don't know" response 
option. Each of these factors decreases the likelihood 
that respondents may feel pressured to offer publicly 
acceptable rhetoric as responses. Third, questions used 
in the analysis here were scattered throughout a long 
survey instrument. This makes it difficult for respon- 
dents to ascertain our research questions and clouds 
their ability to structure responses to affect the results. 
Fourth, there is little need for respondents to actively 
lie. The questions we ask have been subjects of open 
discussion and debate within each of these countries 
for years. Finally, it is hard to think of the incentives 
that would prompt respondents to not only actively lie 
but to do so in a way that would bias our results since 
it would require different incentives for winners and 
for losers. 
The survey instruments included a battery of 
items measuring attitudes toward each nation's 
current electoral system as well as questions about 
specific electoral reform proposals (see online appen- 
dix for question wording). We estimate models for five 
dependent variables; two that measure affect towards 
the respondent's current electoral system and three 
that measure support for specific changes in existing 
electoral arrangements. Measures of affect toward 
status quo electoral arrangements are: (1) satisfaction 
with how democracy is working in the nation and (2) 
opinion about whether the nation's elections accu- 
rately reflect the views of voters. All responses have 
been recoded to reflect dichotomous choices, where 1 
= a positive evaluation on each item, and 0 a negative 
one. Clearly, our expectation is that the biggest 
winners under current rules-winning candidates 
who are members of government-are most likely to 
express positive affect towards current political 
arrangements. 
Our three measures of support for institutional 
change asked respondents: (1) if term limits on legis- 
lators should be adopted, (2) if they support use of 
referendum and initiative, and (3) if the nation's 
existing rules regarding compulsory voting should 
be changed.4 Responses to these items are also 
dichotomized, so that positive responses equal 1. Each 
of these questions presents an electoral arrangement 
that alters the rules under which incumbents were 
elected, and/or alters an incumbent's ability to control 
the policy agenda. Conversely, each proposal may be 
seen as creating new opportunities for politicians who 
lose elections. In general then, we expect that winners 
will be opposed to these proposals. It is important to 
note that some of these proposals for change have 
majority or near majority levels of support among the 
candidates we surveyed, and that these rules-in 
various forms-could be changed by statute or con- 
stitutional amendment processes that are less burden- 
some than the process for amending the U.S. 
Constitution.5 
As Table 1 shows, bivariate results are consistent 
with the self-interest hypothesis: winners are most 
4This means that the question about compulsory voting in Aus- 
tralia is coded such that repealing compulsory voting represents a 
change from the status quo. 
5There is no formal constitution in New Zealand. In the Nether- 
lands, constitutional change requires a two-thirds majority of 
both houses of parliament. Consensus politics there has provided 
for large governing coalitions. In Australia the constitution is 
amended by referendum--but major electoral reforms such as 
compulsory voting were adopted by majorities in parliament. 
Congress can adopt PR for the U.S. House by statute. 
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TABLE 1 Attitudes toward the Electoral Process and Institutional Change by Winners and Losers (%) 
Satisfaction with Democracy Winners Losers Difference x2 (ldf) Government Opposition Difference x2 (ldf) n Total 
New Zealand 80.8 63.6 17.2 5.7 * 87.2 58.4 28.8 23.0 305 66.6 
Netherlands 80.0 55.7 24.3 10.4 ** 73.7 59.0 14.7 3.7 191 63.4 
Germany 86.3 59.8 26.5 50.6 ** 78.7 60.4 18.3 27.5 ** 746 67.8 
Australia 89.7 45.9 43.8 50.2 ** 94.0 44.4 49.6 67.3 ** 470 53.2 
Elections work well in practice 
New Zealand 82.7 64.4 18.3 6.4 * 84.9 60.7 24.2 16.4 ** 305 67.5 
Germany 78.2 39.6 38.6 91.1 ** 66.4 41.4 25.0 43.0 ** 718 51.4 
Australia 86.1 25.8 60.3 103.6 ** 26.4 80.7 -54.3 87.7 ** 470 36.0 
Term limits 
New Zealand 10.0 30.2 -20.2 10.0 ** 27.9 24.6 3.3 .4 282 25.9 
Netherlands 26.7 35.9 -9.2 1.6 32.1 35.1 -3.0 .2 191 33.0 
Germany 38.5 68.8 -30.3 60.3 ** 63.5 57.1 6.4 3.0 746 59.7 
Initiatives 
New Zealand 40.0 50.5 -10.5 2.1 36.9 55.6 -18.7 9.3 ** 282 48.2 
Netherlands 59.6 73.3 -13.7 2.0 48.1 78.0 -29.9 11.7 ** 191 63.9 
Germany 75.0 92.3 -17.3 43.0 ** 95.6 81.4 14.2 31.7 ** 746 83.8 
Australia 64.1 82.2 -18.1 12.9 ** 65.1 82.2 -17.1 12.2 ** 471 79.2 
Compulsory voting 
New Zealand 24.1 50.8 -26.7 12.8 ** 48.8 45.0 3.8 .4 308 46.1 
Netherlands 18.3 21.4 -3.1 .2 19.3 20.9 -1.6 .1 191 20.4 
Germany 19.9 23.3 -3.4 1.0 22.3 22.2 .1 .0 746 22.3 
Australia 20.0 24.2 -4.2 .7 41.2 19.7 21.5 17.9 ** 476 23.5 
**p < .01; *p < .05. 
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supportive of existing political arrangements. The sig- 
nificance of differences between groups is represented 
by chi-square values.6 In Australia, elected MPs were 
twice as likely as losing candidates to be satisfied with 
democracy. In New Zealand, where the difference is 
the smallest, there was still a significant satisfaction 
gap of about 17% between winners (incumbents) and 
candidates who lost. Similar differences in satisfaction 
were found between members of the government and 
opposition parties. The Netherlands uses the most 
proportional system of representation of these four 
nations and is the most consensual form of democ- 
racy in our sample (see Lijphart 1999). We find the 
difference between the government and the opposi- 
tion was the smallest on most items among Dutch 
respondents. 
Clear winner-loser differences exist on the items 
measuring attitudes toward institutional change. 
Overall, candidates in all four countries were generally 
receptive to initiative and referenda use, although they 
were, with the exception of Germany, generally cool 
to the idea of imposing term limits on members of 
parliament. Nevertheless, winners by and large were 
much less likely to support these proposed changes 
than losers. As for compulsory voting, the results are 
generally consistent with our expectations, though the 
gap between winners and losers was rather small in 
Australia, Germany, and the Netherlands. In Australia, 
which is the only country in the sample that has com- 
pulsory voting, winners were slightly less likely to 
want to change the system than the losers. However, 
there was a substantial gap in Australia between the 
government and the opposition on this issue, with the 
Liberal/National government coalition being more 
likely to want to change the system than opposition 
candidates. In New Zealand, losing candidates were 
twice as likely to want to impose compulsory voting 
as the winning candidates. 
Multivariate analysis can establish if there are 
independent, additive effects of our markers of 
incumbent self-interest: winning office and being a 
member of a party in government. It can also estab- 
lish if these markers of incumbent self-interest predict 
attitudes about electoral institutions when we control 
for values and ideology. Our multivariate models of 
politicians' preferences include a dummy variable rep- 
resenting respondents who were elected (winners), 
and a dummy variable representing respondents who 
were affiliated with a party in government. Respon- 
dents affiliated with small parties are also represented 
by a unique dummy variable, as they may have dis- 
tinctive attitudes about PR elections. Our measure of 
post-materialist values is composed of responses to 
two standard questions. Respondents who prioritized 
"giving people more say" over "maintaining order" 
and who also ranked "protecting freedom of speech" 
over "fighting rising prices" were coded 1; those who 
gave top priority to just one of these post-materialist 
values were coded 0; while those who gave top prior- 
ity to prices and maintaining order were coded -1. 
Political ideology is represented by the respondent's 
self-placement on a continuum ranging from 0 (left) 
to 10 (right).7 We also account for the politician's 
assessment of how democracy is working in their 
nation in our estimates of preferences for electoral 
institutions. 
The data have been pooled and dummy variables 
for respondents from New Zealand, the Netherlands, 
and Australia (leaving Germany as the reference 
category) are included in the model to account for 
unspecified nation-specific effects.8 As evident in 
Table 1, one of our questions about affect toward the 
electoral system and one about institutional change 
(term limits) were absent from the Australian survey. 
These cases are lost in the pooled models; however, 
nation-specific estimations produced results (pro- 
vided to reviewers and available online) that are 
substantively similar to those reported here. Logistic 
regression is used to estimate the results since all the 
dependent variables are coded as dichotomous 
choices. 
The results of our logistic regression estimates are 
reported in Table 2 and Table 3. We find consistent 
effects of self-interest (noted as winner and govern- 
ment party) in each estimation. Winning candidates' 
attitudes about their electoral institutions were dis- 
tinctive, moreover, regardless of whether a winner's 
party was in office, and regardless of left-right ideol- 
ogy and post-materialist values. In terms of their per- 
spective on current electoral arrangements (Table 2), 
winners are more likely to be satisfied with democracy 
and are more likely to believe that elections work well 
in practice. We also find a significant, independent 
effect of affiliation with a governing party. Data in 
Table 2 demonstrate that candidates from these 
parties, whether winners or losers, are significantly 
6There are four cells for each significance test. For example, 
winners who are satisfied with democracy, winners who are dis- 
satisfied, losers who are satisfied, losers who are dissatisfied. 
7We estimated the models with and without the ideology and 
Postmaterialism. Inclusion or omission of these variables do not 
affect the results reported. 
8Nation specific estimates are available in the online appendix 
found at: http://www.journalofpolitics.org. 
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TABLE 2 Politicians' General Affect Towards their 
Electoral System 
Satisfaction with Elections Work 
Democracy Well 
Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Winner .43** (.18) .98*** (.21) 
Government party .71*** (.14) 1.00*** (.16) 
Small party -1.07*** (.15) -1.23*** (.19) 
Female .19 (.13) .35** (.16) 
Age -.01* (.01) .00 (.01) 
Postmaterialism -.49*** (.11) -.24* (.14) 
L/R Ideology 1.29*** (.27) .96*** (.34) 
New Zealand -.32* (.16) - - 
Netherlands -.31 (.20) 
Australia -.43*** (.24) -.45** (.17) 
Constant 1.21"*** (.29) -.05 (.38) 
Pseudo R2 .15 .23 
Observations 1,568 1,112 
***p <.01; **p < .05; *p < .10. Note: Logistic regression estimates. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
more complacent about their nation's existing elec- 
toral arrangements. Likewise, candidates from gov- 
erning parties, whether winners or losers, have more 
positive attitudes about current political arrange- 
ments. Respondents from small parties are less sup- 
portive of current political arrangements.9 
As for politicians' support for institutional 
changes (Table 3), winners (from parties in or out of 
government) are significantly less likely than losers to 
support any of the proposed reforms. There was, 
however, no increased likelihood of opposing change 
due to affiliation with a governing party. This result is 
consistent with Katz and Mair's (1995) cartel party 
thesis. Winners from government and opposition 
parties appear quite similar in their hesitance to 
endorse electoral system change (also see Table 4). We 
do find evidence that partisan self-interest motivated 
members of small parties, independent of whether 
they won or lost their elections or their party was in 
government. Respondents from small parties are more 
supportive of term limits and direct democracy. For 
politicians from large parties, their self-interested per- 
spective on electoral institutions thus seems to have 
more to do with their personal electoral success, rather 
than with their party's status in government. All of this 
suggests that winners from larger parties may share a 
cartel-like consensus on their preferences for electoral 
institutions, regardless of the effect of winning or 
losing control of government. 
Despite the consistent effects, self-interest does 
not provide a complete explanation of politicians' 
preferences for these changes in electoral institutions. 
Candidates who are most satisfied about how democ- 
racy is working, for example, are consistently less 
interested in altering existing arrangements. Post- 
materialist values and political ideology also affect 
attitudes about institutions.'1 Candidates on the right 
are more optimistic about status quo political 
arrangements" and are also significantly less support- 
ive of term limits and direct democracy. Contrary to 
our expectation that conservatives would oppose 
change generally, we find they are more supportive of 
changing rules for compulsory voting, although 
nation-specific models demonstrate this relationship 
is exclusive to Australia. We also find that post-mate- 
rialist respondents are consistently less sanguine about 
existing political arrangements. Their dissatisfaction 
with existing electoral practices does not appear to 
have translated into support for new electoral 
arrangements in the pooled analysis. Post-materialists 
in Germany and Australia, however, are more sup- 
portive of direct democracy, and German post-mate- 
rialists are more supportive of term limits. 
To ease the interpretation of the results, we trans- 
lated the logit coefficients estimated from our models 
into predicted probabilities for those variables where 
our models predict statistically significant differences 
between key groups of candidates. These illustrate the 
effect a change in one of our independent variables 
has on increasing the probability that a respondent 
gave a positive reply on our dependent variables, 
with the effects of other independent variables held 
constant. 
Table 4 presents the gap in attitudes and the gap 
in support for change between winners and losers, 
grouped by whether or not the candidate was from a 
party that ended up in government. Winners from 
government parties are much more sanguine about 
existing electoral arrangements than winners from 
opposition parties, and opposition party losers are 
least optimistic about current electoral arrangements. 
Government party winners have a .81 probability of 
saying they are satisfied with democracy, and a .77 
probability of saying that elections work well at 
9Further analysis shows that small party candidates were more 
likely to think that their nation's PR system was fair. 
'0These two ordinal items are modestly correlated (-.31); right of 
center candidates are less post-materialistic. 
"This result is largely driven by Germany. 
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TABLE 3 Politicians' Attitudes Toward Institutional Change 
Use Referendums Change Laws on 
Adopt Term Limits and & Initiatives Compulsory Voting 
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Winner -.76*** (.18) -.30* (.16) -.64*** (.19) 
Government party .33** (.15) .10 (.14) .23 (.15) 
Small party .66*** (.17) .83*** (.16) -.56** (.18) 
Female .51*** (.15) -.05 (.14) -.27* (.16) 
Age .02** (.01) .00 (.01) .01** (.00) 
Satisfaction with democracy -.59*** (.15) -.19 (.15) -.56*** (.16) 
Post-materialism .05 (.14) .13 (.13) -.21 (.13) 
L/R Ideology -1.08*** (.35) -1.42*** (.30) .59* (.32) 
New Zealand -1.86*** (.19) -1.87*** (.18) - 
Netherlands -.96*** (.20) -.78*** (.21) -.09 (.21) 
Australia - -.35** (.17) -.02 (.28) 
Constant .08 (.38) 1.85*** (.37) -1.08** (.36) 
Pseudo R2 .17 .14 .03 
Observations 1,126 1,567 1,302 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10. 
Note: Logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
TABLE 4 Predicted Probabilities of Support; Winners and Losers by Government Party Status 
Opposition Party Government Party 
Losers Winners Losers Winners 
Conf. Conf. Conf. Conf. 
prob. Int. (+/-) prob. Int. (+/-) A prob. Int. (+/-) prob. Int. (+/) A 
Satisfaction with .58 (.04) .67 (.06) .09 .73 (.05) .81 (.05) .08 
democracy 
Elections work well .31 (.04) .55 (.06) .24 .56 (.07) .77 (.07) .21 
in practice 
Term limits .49 (.05) .31 (.07) -.18 .57 (.06) .38 (.08) -.19 
Initiative .79 (.03) .74 (.06) -.05 .81 (.04) .76 (.06) -.05 
Compulsory voting .24 (.03) .14 (.04) -.10 .28 (.05) .17 (.05) -.11 
Note: Estimates derived from Tables 2 and 3 holding all other variables constant at their mean. 
Confidence intervals are 95 and calculated by delta method (Xu and Long forthcoming). 
reflecting the views of voters. In contrast, winning 
candidates from opposition parties have a .67 proba- 
bility of being satisfied with democracy and a .55 
probability of saying that elections worked well. 
Despite substantial differences between government 
and opposition winners' attitudes about existing elec- 
toral arrangements, these winning candidates have 
fairly similar views about changing institutions. 
Winners in government are predicted to have just a .38 
probability of supporting term limits, similar to the 
probability of support among opposition party 
winners (.31). Governing party winners are predicted 
to have just a .17 probability of changing rules about 
compulsory voting, similar to the probability of 
support among opposition winners (.14). 
Table 5 reports the predicted probabilities of the 
independent effects of ideology and post-materialist 
values. Again, we find that these variables have sub- 
stantial effects on politicians' evaluations of existing 
elections and on the probability of their supporting 
electoral reforms. Post-materialists values are associ- 
ated with nearly a .21 decrease in the probability that 
a candidate is satisfied with how democracy is 
working, and a .12 decrease in the probability that a 
respondent thinks elections work well reflecting 
voters' views. The effects of being on the farthest ends 
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TABLE 5 Predicted Probabilities of Support; by Post-Materialism and Ideology 
Materialist Post-Materialist Left Right 
Conf. Conf. Conf. Conf. 
prob. Int. (+/-) prob. Int. (+/-) A prob. Int. (+/-) prob. Int. (+/-) A 
Satisfaction with .77 (.05) .57 (.05) -.21 .53 (.06) .80 (.05) .27 
democracy 
Elections work well .52 (.09) .40 (.06) -.12 .35 (.07) .59 (.10) .23 
in practice 
Term limits .45 (.09) .48 (.07) .03 .57 (.07) .31 (.09) -.26 
Initiative .75 (.06) .80 (.04) .05 .87 (.03) .61 (.09) -.26 
Compulsory voting .27 (.07) .19 (.04) -.07 .18 (.04) .29 (.08) .10 
Note: Estimates derived from Tables 2 and 3 holding all other variables constant at their mean. 
Confidence intervals are 95 and calculated by delta method (Xu and Long forthcoming). 
of the ideological spectrum are quite striking; with 
conservatives generally more opposed to change. 
Other things being held equal, a candidate on the 
far left has a .87 predicted probability of supporting 
direct democracy, while a candidate on the far right is 
predicted to have a .61 probability of this. The 
left-right gap in support for term limits is similar. 
Left-right differences in support for compulsory 
voting run in the opposite direction, but are nearly the 
same magnitude. 
Overall, our results demonstrate that politicians' 
self-interest operates, quite often, as theory predicts. 
Compared to values and ideology, the expected effects 
of electoral self-interest on preferences for institutions 
are readily understood from prior theory. Although 
we also find effects of values and ideology, the effects 
of ideology in particular are not as easy to explain. We 
do not know, a priori, why conservatives in these 
nations should be more supportive of changing rules 
on compulsory voting, nor what causes leftists to favor 
term limits.'2 Nonetheless, it is important to note that 
there are sizeable independent effects of values and 
ideology and that the substantive magnitude of these 
effects rivals the effect of electoral self-interest. The 
difference in probability of support for term limits, for 
example, is greater between far left and far right 
respondents (a .26 difference in probability of 
support) than it is between governing party winners 
and losing candidates of opposition parties (a .11 dif- 
ference). Likewise, the difference in the probability of 
supporting use of initiative and referendum between 
winners in government and losing candidates from 
the opposition is just .03. The difference in probabil- 
ity of support for this between candidates on the far 
left and far right is (.26). Politicians' preferences for 
electoral institutions thus appear to be shaped by the 
independent effects of self-interest and by the equally 
important but less systematic effects of values and ide- 
ology. The former are perhaps easily understood given 
existing theory, but the latter are important enough to 
suggest that existing theory may inflate the dominant 
role of electoral self-interest on politicians' preferences 
for institutions. 
Discussion 
Plainly, there is a difference between attitudes towards 
change that politicians reveal in academic surveys and 
change itself. Attitudes, however, are a necessary pre- 
cursor to change, and we can thus learn more about 
the conditions that shape actual change from these 
responses. 
When we look at politicians' attitudes about pro- 
posals to change their electoral institutions, we find 
significant effects of personal electoral self-interest, 
evaluations of how democracy is working, post-mate- 
rialist values, and ideology. The effect of self-interest 
is partly a confirmation of a received wisdom that is 
not often put to the direct test. This confirmation, 
however, is tempered by the acknowledgement that 
self-interest is not the entire explanation of how 
politicians view electoral institutions. Self-interest is a 
major determinant of attitudes but other factors also 
play a role. Values and ideology play an important but 
not quite as predictable a role in structuring elite 
responses to institutions. Ideological pressures are 
'2The latter effect may likely be driven by Australian conservatives 
in the Liberal/National coalition who are opposed to the use of 
compulsory voting in that nation, as it is assumed to advantage 
Labor. 
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seen as left-wingers and right-wingers offer compet- 
ing views of an ideal political process. 
We also find an important difference between per- 
sonal and partisan electoral interests. A candidate's 
personal electoral self-interest has a systematic effect 
on attitudes about changing political institutions that 
remains significant even after we account for their 
evaluations of how democracy is working, their values 
and ideology. Candidates who win, from government 
and opposition parties, appear more similar in their 
views about change than candidates who lose. This 
result is consistent with the party cartel theory that 
assumes politicians in office share an incentive to limit 
competition with those who are out of office. 
These findings beg an important question: if 
values and ideology have effects that are as substan- 
tively large as electoral self-interest (as we find here), 
then why do electoral institutions remain so stable in 
established democracies? That is, why don't these 
institutions change more often when candidates with 
different values and ideology defeat incumbent politi- 
cians? The case of the German Greens offers some 
insight to this question. Despite being winners (i.e., 
affiliated with the party in government and even 
elected to the legislature), Green respondents elected 
to the Bundestag remain committed to institutional 
changes that advance the role "outsiders" would have 
in the political process (GPCA Platform 2004). 
German Greens support referendum and initiative use 
in astonishingly large proportions. However, when 
other things (such as ideology and party status) are 
held constant, our models still predict that a candidate 
who wins an election is significantly less likely to 
support direct democracy. So, just as German Greens 
moderated their positions on NATO and Kosovo once 
in government, these results suggest that a candidate's 
perspectives on electoral institutions may also change 
once they win. Indeed, German Green commitment to 
radical democratic practices such as rotation in office 
(term limits) was strained, if not weakened, in order 
for Joschka Fischer to reach the post of Foreign Min- 
ister (Klotzsch et al. 1998). 
This example is by no means unique: Britain's 
Labour party lost enthusiasm for PR after they won in 
1997. Australian opposition candidates similarly 
forgot their interest in direct democracy once in 
power (Williams and Chin 2000), and Republicans in 
the United States gave up their push for term limits on 
Congress (part of their "Contract with America") 
soon after taking control of the U.S. House of Repre- 
sentatives in 1994. These real-world examples, com- 
bined with our results, provide evidence consistent 
with the argument that personal electoral self-interest 
is a powerful determinant of politicians' attitudes 
towards institutions. 
What are the wider consequences of these results? 
Over the longer term politicians appear likely to 
become strongly committed to the rules that made 
them winners. As obvious as this may sound, it offers 
an explanation for a puzzle. Rules and institutions are 
supposed to limit cycling over outcomes by making, 
for example, some changes difficult or by making 
some actors more consequential. However, if institu- 
tions are seen as a solution to cycling over preferences 
then, as Riker (1986) asks, what if preferences over 
institutions-and hence institutions themselves- 
cycle? It is a question that pushes an explanation of 
political stability back a stage further: institutional 
forces alone may not explain stability if preferences 
over institutions also cycle as politicians make chang- 
ing the rules part of the game. 
Our answer to that question is that winners 
become invested in, or at least attached to, the rules 
that made them winners. Winners are committed to 
the status quo-even if they are very recent winners 
and even if they are in the opposition. This is a some- 
what different interpretation of why institutions rep- 
resent "congealed preferences" than offered by Riker, 
to whom we owe the phrase. Winners are reluctant to 
change rules that made them winners and-hence- 
we can expect to see only very slow changes in those 
sorts of rules. We know that the people and parties 
who form governments change relatively frequently. 
But we also know that the electoral institutions that 
structure how these governments come into place are 
quite static. Much of the stability of election rules may 
reflect that being in parliament (winning) quickly 
unites actors who differ in terms of policy preferences 
and ideology at least on one dimension. Winning 
election and serving in parliament leads to a unifying 
electoral self-interest that dampens support for insti- 
tutional change among those who may have embraced 
change when on the outside looking in. 
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